The leaders of Groups 23 to 27 are other types. The leaders of Groups 23 to 25 punish only followers who neither contribute nor support leaders, and thus, it is difficult to categorize either L-, S-or G-type leaders.
The leaders of Groups 26 and 27 punish followers who contribute and support leaders. Table S1 . Summary of leaders' punishment and followers' behavior in the support-present condition. In conclusion, the findings reported in the main text are robust, even when we include the data of the two groups in which the leaders punished followers who contribute and support their leaders. In conclusion, the tendencies reported in the main text are strong, even in the less sensitive categorizations of leader punishment types.
Analysis with categorization of leaders by cluster analysis
We categorize leader punishment types without a priori assumptions. We perform cluster analysis with
Ward's method, in which clustering variables are the percentages of punishment for each four follower types;
the followers who contribute and support their leaders, who contribute and do not support their leaders, who do not contribute but support their leaders, and who do not contribute and do not support their leaders. The data of Group 1 are eliminated because this group do not have the data of punishment to followers who do not contribute and do not support their leaders. Figure S1 shows the results of the cluster analysis. A solution with three clusters is utilized in the present analyses. Only three leaders, those of Groups 8, 9, and 10, except for other types, are clustered in the different groups from the original categorization of L, S, and G types.
This result indicates that these three clusters are very similar to the original categorization of L, S, and G types.
We calculate the means of the important indexes (see Table S2 ). Cluster 1 leaders strongly punish both non-contributors and non-supporters. The Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test reveals there is no difference among the punishment to three follower types, that is, followers who contribute and do not support their leaders, followers who do not contribute but support their leaders, and followers who do not contribute and do not support their leaders (ps.>10). Therefore, Cluster 1 leaders can be regarded as L type. Cluster 3, p < .001, Cluster 1 higher. We consistently find the same results in this more objective categorization, and thus, we conclude that the categorization of L-, S-, and G-type leaders in an original way is valid and reasonable. Here, we demonstrate the analysis without categorized punishment type, because categorized punishment types L, S, and G might be somewhat arbitrary.
In the support-present condition, cooperation levels are clearly polarized (see Figure 1) . We perform cluster analysis with Ward's method, in which clustering a variable is a PGG contribution. The results are shown in Figure S2 . The results reveal that groups are categorized as high cooperation groups (N=10, from 326.7 to 493.3 for average total PGG contribution) and low cooperation groups (N=17, from 26.7 to 180.0 for average total PGG contribution).
Figure S2. Cluster dendrogram of PGG contribution
We compare the punishment of leaders in high cooperation groups with those in low cooperation groups in order to investigate why this polarization occurred. Table S3 shows the comparison between low and high cooperation groups for the 15 periods. These results clearly indicate that the leaders of high cooperation groups are more likely to punish both non-contributors and non-supporters. In other words, strong linkage punishment by a leader leads to a high cooperation level in PGG. The Mann-Whitney U-test reveals that the leaders of high cooperation groups are more likely to punish followers who do not contribute but support their leaders (p<.001), followers who contribute and do not support their leaders (p<.001), and followers who do not contribute and do not support their leaders (p<.001) than the leaders of low cooperation groups.
In addition, support for the leader and total profit of the leader are larger in high cooperation groups than in low cooperation groups (p< .001, p< .001, respectively), which indicates that strong linkage punishment induces support for the leader and benefits not only the group but also the leader himself or herself.
In summary, the analysis without punishment type of leaders suggests that linkage punishment leads to high group cooperation and is beneficial for the leader. After a brief verbal introduction, participants read the following instructions on the computer monitor telling them that they will take part in an experiment on decision making.
General Guidance
This is an experiment about decision making. You will be paid for participating, and the amount of money you will earn depends on the decisions that you and the other participants make. At the end of today's session you will be paid in cash for your decisions privately.
You will never be asked to reveal your identity to anyone during the course of the experiment.
Your name will never be associated with any of your decisions.
At this time, you will be given 500 yens (= 5~6 dollars) for coming on time. All the money that you earn after this experiment will be yours to keep.
Earnings
In this experiment you are in a group of size 6 (you plus 5 others) and you will be asked to make a series of choices about how to allocate a set of tokens. You and the other subjects has been randomly assigned to the group, and you will not be able to know each other's identities. But the group members remained the same throughout the experiment.
The details of the experimental transactions are as follows. There are two different roles in the experiment. Five members named A, B, C, D and E will play the same role, but one member named Z will play a different role. Who will be assigned as Z will be selected randomly in the beginning of the experiment and these roles remained the same throughout the experiment. The experiment comprised three stages, 1 st stage, 2 nd stage and 3 rd stage. These stages will be repeated 15 times, and the tokens you earn during transactions will be redeemed as monetary remuneration. Now, let us explain the details of each stage.
st stage:
Each of the six members, including Z, are given 100 tokens at the beginning of the stage. The members except for Z are asked to decide whether to contribute all 100 tokens to the group pool or not at all.
The tokens each member contributed are doubled and distributed equally to five members except for Z.
This means that each time one member make a contribution, all five members except for Z received 40 tokens each. Z was completely independent from the other members. Although Z are given 100 tokens, like the other members, s/he does not make decisions during this stage and simply earns 100 tokens.
Examples of choices you will make in this experiment and earnings These three stages will be repeated 15 times. The total attained score will be converted to money using the rate 1 token＝0.7 yen, and the converted amount will be provided plus 500 yen (the show-up fee)
given to you at the end of this experiment.
After this general instruction above, all participants start the experiment after filling out a confirmation test.
Confirmation Test
Before you start to make your decision, we should solve all questions on the paper. Read carefully through the provided information and write down the number of points on the paper. We will watch you solving the examples, check whether you get the right answers, and help you in case there is a problem or a question.
Before the decision-making
Good, now everybody has correctly solved the problems. We will distribute the form on which you will write down the results of each stage, such as who contributed, who provided for Z, and how many tokens Z reduced from A to E (see Figure S3 ). Whenever you want, you can refer to the previous results by 11 referring to the form. If anybody has any more questions, raise your hand now. Otherwise, let us practice how to make your decisions on your computer screens and how to write down the results on the form. Your total profit of this period：( ) Figure S3 . Form in which the participants fill out the results of each period in the support-present condition (above) and the no-support condition (below)
